Betterness of permissibility by Ferguson, Benjamin & Köhler, Sebastian
Betterness of permissibility
Benjamin Ferguson1 • Sebastian Ko¨hler2
 The Author(s) 2019
Abstract It is often assumed that morally permissible acts are morally better than
impermissible acts. We call this claim Betterness of Permissibility. Yet, we show
that some striking counterexamples show that the claim’s truth cannot be taken for
granted. Furthermore, even if Betterness of Permissibility is true, it is unclear why.
Apart from appeals to its intuitive plausibility, no arguments in favour of the
condition exist. We fill this lacuna by identifying two fundamental conditions that
jointly entail betterness of permissibility: ‘reasons monotonicity of permissibility’
and the ‘weak classical view’. We then argue that there are good reasons for
accepting both of the fundamental conditions. We note that there exist plausible
moral theories that reject one of the fundamental conditions. However, the way in
which those theories reject the fundamental conditions does not allow them to
endorse the counterexamples that motivate the belief that Betterness of Permissi-
bility might be false.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that as you stroll along a beach one evening a storm suddenly strikes. You
soon hear the panicked shouts of two swimmers who will surely not last long in the
growing swells. Though you’d like to help them, you’re no seaman and the
conditions are extremely perilous; if you put out to save them, it is possible you’ll
all drown. We think most people would agree that, given the risk, you are not
morally obliged to save the swimmers. However, it also seems that if you could save
even one, this would be morally better than staying on the beach. Nevertheless,
suppose that you spot a dinghy on the beach and heroically attempt a rescue. When
you reach them, the swimmers are side-by-side and you could pull both into the boat
and make it back to shore. However, suppose you save only one, leaving the other to
drown. We think most people would agree that if you do put out to save the
swimmers, given that you could save both, it is impermissible to save only one.1
If you believe it is not obligatory to attempt a rescue, morally better to save one
than none, but impermissible to save only one, then you are committed to the claim
that there are situations in which impermissible acts are morally better than
permissible acts. This claim conflicts with the common moral platitude that
Permissible acts are morally better than impermissible acts. Call this claim
betterness of permissibility, or BOP.
Determining what one ought (and ought not) to do in situations like the drowning
case is an important issue. However, the point of this paper is not to argue for a
particular verdict in such cases. Rather, we will show that verdicts about what one
should do that are incompatible with BOP incur a high theoretical cost. In particular,
verdicts which claim both that it is morally better to save one than none and that it is
impermissible to save one violate BOP. We will show that accepting such verdicts
requires abandoning at least one of two widely held views about the relationship
between reasons, actions, and goodness.
If you think BOP is obviously true, you might set out to debunk the moral
assessments in the drowning case that jointly contradict it. However, it is unclear
what considerations, apart from intuition, support BOP because even though it is
commonly accepted, it is nowhere explicitly defended.2 So, you could instead take
these intuitions about the cases at face value and reject the platitude. After all, there
is no necessary logical connection between permissibility and moral goodness.3 In
short, if the BOP platitude is true, it is unclear why.
1 Let us also suppose that there are no antecedent moral obligations that prohibit you from attempting to
save the swimmers and that neither swimmer is morally more deserving of rescue.
2 Sobel (2013: 102) endorses the condition, but he implies that it is obviously true, writing that ‘‘It is not
merely that the morally permissible acts are better than the impermissible. Some bad types of action are
worse than others.’’
3 There is, of course, a connection between goodness and permissibility within particular moral theories.
Consequentialism, for example, defines permissibility by way of goodness. But the defence of these
relations requires additional argument. BOP is a metaethical claim about moral goodness in the sense in
which consequentialists and non-consequentialists offer competing theories of what it is. It is a claim that
constrains the possible relations between goodness and permissibility that might be advanced at the level
of normative ethics.
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Our primary aim in this paper is to identify theoretical claims that could be used
to support or criticise BOP that go beyond mere platitudes. In Sect. 2 we identify two
antecedent claims and show they jointly entail BOP. In Sect. 3 we identify a number
of cases that, like the drowning case, elicit intuitions that conflict with BOP. The
breadth of these cases demonstrates the urgency of assessing the truth of the
antecedent claims. In Sects. 4 and 5 we consider the plausibility of the two entailing
conditions. There we show that BOP violating judgements in counterexample cases
come with a very significant—and as yet unrecognised—theoretical cost. Section 6
concludes.
2 The formal framework and entailment claim
If BOP is true, it should be supported by theoretical arguments. Yet, as we noted
above, no argument for BOP currently exists in the literature. In this section we
identify two conditions that jointly entail BOP. These conditions not only provide
antecedent support for BOP, they also help to clarify how moral reasons, moral value,
and moral permissibility are related.
Here we present a formal framework in which BOP and the conditions that entail it
can be more precisely expressed. First we define BOP in this framework, then we
present the two conditions: the weak classical view and reasons monotonicity of
permissibility. Finally, we provide an informal proof of the entailment claim and
discuss an objection to our formal assumptions.
2.1 Defining BOP
We will assume that moral goodness and permissibility each retain a basic structure
that is independent from both the content that they are given by any particular moral
theory and the way that any particular moral theory relates the two (e.g., whether
that theory respects BOP). Thus, we appeal to the broad concepts of permissibility
and goodness and not to particular conceptions of goodness and permissibility found
within particular moral theories.
We will be concerned primarily with moral goodness as a property of acts and do
not follow the more common restriction of goodness to states of affairs. Admittedly,
this is already a significant assumption, since it conflicts with the standard
consequentialist claim that moral goodness is a property of states of affairs.4 By
focusing on the goodness of acts, we do not deny that states of affairs can also be
good. And indeed, we think consequentialists can easily endorse BOP. Consequen-
tialism is compatible with BOP if acts’ goodness derives from, or is grounded by, the
fundamental (for consequentialists) goodness of state of affairs. That is, conse-
quentialists could allow that acts are good just in case they have an appropriate
4 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.
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promotional relation (e.g. actual promotion, expected promotion, etc) with this
fundamental source of goodness.5 We turn now to the formal framework.
Let X be a finite set of (token) acts, Z be the set of all nonempty subsets of X, and
A be an agenda6, such that A 2 Z. We define moral goodness in terms of betterness
relations. Let <m represent weak moral betterness, a relation defined on X, such that
8x; y 2 X : x<m y iff x is morally at least as good as y.7 We assume <m is a total
order on X; that is, all acts in X can be ordered on a ‘goodness scale’ where higher
ranked acts are morally better, or ‘more good’, than lower ranked acts.8 We
presuppose no link between prudential and moral goodness. Moral goodness need
not be restricted to what is ‘good for’ a person. Further, our understanding of
goodness is compatible with buck passing accounts of goodness that claim goodness
‘‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways,
[but] to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’’
Scanlon (1998: 97).
We will assume that permissibility is a modal property that partitions acts into
two mutually exclusive categories: acts are permissible iff they possess some right-
making property and acts are impermissible iff they are not permissible.9 Note that
what we mean here is permissibility and impermissibility all things considered, not
prima facie. We let P represent permissibility and :P impermissibility. It is now
possible to formally define BOP as the claim that for all agendas A in Z and all acts
x, y in A, if x is permissible and y is impermissible, then x is morally better than y:
8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x m y ð1Þ
Having formally defined BOP, we now turn to the two conditions that jointly entail it.
2.2 The weak classical view
The weak classical view is a weakened version of the the classical view of
intentional action, a widely held (Anscombe 1957; Aristotle 1999; Davidson 1963;
Raz 1999; Smith 2009) account that claims ‘‘intentional action is action for a
5 Some consequentialists may deny that there is any sense in which goodness can be a property of acts.
For those theorists, BOP, in both its formal and colloquial forms, involves a category mistake. We do not
claim that BOP must be true of all moral theories. Rather we claim that theories with language rich enough
to express BOP have good reasons to respect it.
6 An agenda is is simply the set of options available to an agent in a particular context. We use agendas
here since acts’ permissibility and goodness may be relative to the options available to an agent. If A can
only save B from death by breaking her arm, then doing so is permissible. But it is not permissible if less
harmful options are available.
7 We define moral indifference and strict moral betterness in the usual way: 8x; y 2 X : x m y iff x<m y
and y<m x; and 8x; y 2 X : x m y iff x<m y and :ðy<m xÞ.
8 The total order assumption implies betterness relations over actions are complete and transitive. Weak
moral betterness is transitive when, 8x; y; z 2 X : if x<m y and y<m z then x<m z. Transitivity is criticised
in Temkin (2012), though see Voorhoeve (2013) for a rebuttal. Weak moral betterness is complete when
8x; y 2 X where x 6¼ y : x<m y or y<m x or x m y. Vallentyne (1993) challenges the completeness
assumption, which we discuss below.
9 For theories that make permissibility a function of multiple properties, acts are permissible iff right-
making properties are undefeated. Peterson (2013) defends an alternative approach.
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reason; and that reasons are facts in virtue of which those actions are good in some
respect and to some degree’’ (Raz 1999: 23). The weak classical view departs from
this traditional view in two ways. First, it concerns only the second half of the
traditional view. The weak version makes a claim only about the relation between
reasons and goodness. Second, the weak classical view is restricted to the moral
domain and concerns only moral reasons and moral goodness.
Let <r represent ‘weak reasons superiority’, a relation defined on X, such that
8x; y 2 X : x<r y iff the moral reasons that speak in favour of performing x are at
least as strong as the moral reasons that speak in favour of performing y.10 Formally,
the weak classical view claims that for all x and y, there is at least as strong a moral
reason to x as there is to y, if and only if x is at least morally as good as y11:
8x; y 2 X : x<r y $ x<m y ð2Þ
2.3 Reasons monotonicity of permissibility
The second condition, reasons monotonicity of permissibility concerns the
relationship between reasons and permissibility. The condition claims that if act
x is permissible, then any other acts that the moral reasons speak more strongly in
favour of performing must also be permissible. Note that the condition does not
require maximisation. It does not claim, (as Davidson’s continence principle does)
that we ought to ‘‘perform the action judged best on the basis of all available
relevant reasons’’ (Davidson 1980: 43). It merely entails that all acts that are at least
as strongly supported as the permissible act with the weakest reasons must also be
permissible.
Formally, the condition claims that for all agendas A in Z and all acts x, y, in A if
x is permissible and the moral reasons for performing y are at least as strong as those
for performing x, then y is also permissible. That is,
8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ ! Py ð3Þ
2.4 Entailment
In ‘‘Appendix 1’’ we provide a formal proof that the weak classical view (2) and
reasons monotonicity of permissibility (3) jointly entail BOP (1). Informally,
however, the relationship between the claims is fairly straightforward. At the
general level, reasons monotonicity is a claim about how the moral reasons for an
act relate to its permissibility. BOP is a claim about how the moral goodness of an act
relates to its permissibility. To move from one of these claims to the other we
require the weak classical view, which claims that moral goodness is a necessary
condition for moral reasons.
More precisely, if it is true both (by (3)) that if act x is permissible, then any other
acts that the moral reasons speak more strongly in favour of performing than x must
10 We define reasons equivalence and strict reasons superiority in the usual way: 8x; y 2 X : x r y iff
x<r y and y<r x; and 8x; y 2 X : x r y iff x<r y and :ðy<r xÞ.
11 Note that since we assume <m is a total order on X, by (2), it follows that <r is too.
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also be permissible; and (by (2)) that if there are stronger moral reasons for x than y,
then x is morally better than y; then (1) also follows: all acts morally better than
x are also permissible. Thus, as BOP claims, there can be no impermissible acts that
are morally better than permissible acts.
These two conditions do not constitute a full theoretical argument for BOP. We
provide this discussion in Sects. 4 and 5. However, we point out that on its own, this
entailment does provide an antecedent consideration that speaks in favour of BOP
because arguements about the plausibility of BOP can appeal to these more
fundamental claims, rather than relying on intuitions about cases and moral
platitudes.
2.5 Completeness
Finally, we will briefly discuss an objection to our assumption that <m is a total
order on X. This assumption implies moral goodness is a complete order. There are
many ways completeness can be violated. For example, acts might be incomparable
in terms of betterness because they are ‘‘on a par’’ (Chang 1997, 2002) or ‘‘roughly
equal’’ (Griffin 1986) and acts might not be comparable at all, because their values
are incommensurable (Raz 1986). Many moral theories allow value incommensu-
rability or incomparability and thus, do not satisfy completeness (Vallentyne 1993).
Incompleteness is often motivated by dilemmas, such as ‘Sophie’s choice’ (Styron
1980) which forces a mother to choose which of her two children to sacrifice,
‘Sartre’s choice’ which involves selecting possible futures (?), and ‘hard choices’,
e.g., between careers (Raz 1986; Chang 1997).
However, to our knowledge all illustrations of incompleteness rely on the
incomparability of two permissible acts or two impermissible acts. These cases do
not directly threaten BOP, which compares permissible acts and impermissible acts.
Perhaps certain comparisons within the domain of permissibility or within the
domain of impermissibility are not possible. But as long as we can compare
permissible acts to impermissible acts in terms of moral betterness, incompleteness
does not threaten BOP. Furthermore, none of the counterexamples to BOP that we will
illustrate in the following section rely on incompleteness. Those cases all involve
explicit betterness comparisons. They threaten BOP not because the moral value of
the acts they involve cannot be compared in terms of betterness, but rather because
they involve assessments that contradict BOP.
3 BOP violations
The previous section demonstrates that the weak classical view and reasons
monotonicity of permissibility jointly entail BOP. This result is important because it
connects BOP, which is a metaethical claim, to two claims about rational action.
These more fundamental conditions help us to better understand why BOP seems so
plausible. Yet, without further argument, they do not definitively tell against the
BOP-violating intuitions in the drowning case. We will assess the plausibility of the
weak classical view and reasons monotonicity in Sect. 4 and 5. First though, in this
B. Ferguson , S. Ko¨hler
123
section, we present three other cases that elicit BOP-violating intuitions. In all of
these cases there are various ways that the moral verdicts can be made compatible
with BOP. However, as in the drowning case, we will not defend any particular
constellation of BOP respecting judgements. Our purpose in this section is to
demonstrate that BOP constrains moral judgements in a much broader range of cases
than the drowning example. This broad scope of applicability makes the assessment
of the entailing conditions’ truth all the more pressing.
3.1 Exploitation and conditional obligations
The first case involves exploitation and unfair transaction. It is structurally is similar
to the drowning case. As Ferguson (2016) shows, the following three claims are
commonly endorsed12 in debates about exploitation and they jointly imply that BOP
is false. It is:
(E1) Permissible to not engage in mutually beneficial transactions, but
(E2) Morally better to engage in mutually beneficial transactions than to not,
(E3) Impermissible to gain unfairly in mutually beneficial transactions.
BOP is violated when a transaction is mutually beneficial, but unfair because by (E3)
engaging in it is impermissible, but by (E2) morally better than not transacting and
not transacting, by (E1) is permissible. Although engaging in mutually beneficial
transaction is not ordinarily morally required, if you choose to engage in a mutually
beneficial transaction with someone, then, it seems, you’re obliged to do so fairly.
Although Ferguson himself rejects the welfarist claim (E2), David Faraci has
recently argued that BOP should be rejected instead. He claims ‘‘there are perfectly
consistent, intuitive ethical positions that vindicate [claims (E1–E3)], in particular
‘‘deontological claims on which more rightness goes hand-in-hand with less
goodness’’ (Faraci 2019: 170, 175).
Both the exploitation case and the drowning case13 are a token examples of a
case type that involves the conjunction of the following three claims. It is:
(C1) Morally permissible to refrain from performing acts of type U, but
(C2) Morally better to perform acts of type U than not, and
(C3) Some token /-ings are impermissible.
This last claim, (C3), relies on a form of conditional obligations (Pummer 2019;
Horton 2017) that arise only after a person commits to a particular action type, such
as the conditional claim that ‘if you put out to save the swimmers and can easily
12 See Zwolinski (2007) and Wertheimer (1996) for discussions of these claims.
13 The drowning case can be rendered in the same form as follows. It is:
(D1) Permissible to not attempt a rescue, but
(D2) Morally better to save one than none, and
(D3) Impermissible to save only one when you could save both.
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save both, then you are obliged to save both’.14 BOP violations can thus be
generalised to a family of cases, in which claims (C1)–(C3) are plausibly true.
3.2 Lotteries for indivisible goods
Cases involving conditional obligations are not the only situations in which
plausible violations of BOP arise. For example, many people think that morality
sometimes requires the use of lotteries to distribute indivisible goods, such as
kidneys (Broome 1990; Diamond 1967). Suppose both A and B are equally good
candidates for a kidney transplant, but only one kidney is available.15 The following
three claims jointly violate BOP:
(L1) the moral value of A receiving the kidney is equal to the moral value of B
receiving the kidney (because, say, the welfare gains under each outcome
are equal).
(L2) there are moral constraints that apply to how the kidneys are allocated:
giving a kidney directly to either A or B is impermissible. It is only
permissible to use a fair coin toss to select the recipient.
(L3) the moral value of a randomised act is equal to the expected moral value of
its parts (and you think the ‘parts’ here are simply the act of giving a kidney
to A and giving a kidney to B).16
To see why (L1)–(L3) violate BOP, let us assign 1 to the value of getting the kidney
and 0 to the value of not getting it. If the moral value of a randomised act is equal to
the expected moral value of its parts, then the moral value of the coin flip is
ð1
2
 1 þ 0Þ þ ð1
2
 0 þ 1Þ, which is 1. But the moral value of giving the kidney
directly to A is also 1, as is the moral value of giving the kidney directly to B. Thus,
the moral values of the direct acts and the randomised act are equal, but only the
randomised acts are permissible. Because BOP claims permissible acts are strictly
morally better than impermissible acts, this result violates BOP.
3.3 The doctrine of double effect
Finally, some deontologists might also have theoretical qualms about BOP since it
appears to imply a commitment to teleological theories, which claim the right17
depends on the good. Teleological theories are incompatible with deontological
views that deny the right depends on the good. Strictly speaking, BOP is compatible
with the deontological claim that the right is prior to the good. Yet, since it does
14 Both Pummer (2019) and Horton (2017) discuss a similar case, the ‘All or Nothing’ problem. However
their discussions of this problem are concerned with defending particular solutions to the problem and
not, as we are, with the defence of a metaprinciple that places constrains on a family of admissible
solutions.
15 We thank Martin Peterson for this example.
16 (L3) is a common consequentialist claim, but it is not universally held by consequentialists. See, e.g.,
Stefa´nsson (2015) for a different approach.
17 We will use ‘right’ interchangeably with ‘permissible’.
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imply that y cannot be impermissible if y is at least as good as x and x is permissible,
moral permissibility assessments that comply with BOP will always be coextensive
with those of (non-maximising)18 teleological theories.
Whether this is problematic for a deontologist depends on whether they think
deontology must differ from teleology only in the considerations that it uses to justify
permissibility assessments, or whether deontological moral assessments must also, at
times differ from teleological assessments. For example, those who think deontological
theories entail different permissibility assessments from consequentialism in some of
the trolley problems (Thomson 1985) will be troubled by this implication of BOP.
In particular, BOP is incompatible with an interpretation of the doctrine of double
effect, which claims ‘‘there is a moral constraint on intending evil (such as harm),
even when the evil will be a means to a greater good’’ (Kamm 2007: 21).19 This
doctrine is often used to explain non-teleological permissibility assessments in the
trolley problem. So, although BOP is not directly incompatible with deontology, it is
incompatible with permissibility assessments that differ from teleological permis-
sibility assessments, such as those that follow from the doctrine of double effect.
Deontologists probably have the strongest theoretical reasons to resist BOP.
However, the kidney case shows that you also do not need to depart too far from
canonical consequentialist views to violate BOP.
To reiterate, our purpose in this paper is not to identify which of, e.g., (E1)–(E3)
are true. Rather it is to point out that if you accept BOP, then you must reject one of
the claims that conflict with BOP. And, since we have shown that the weak classical
view and reasons monotonicity of permissibility jointly entail BOP, it also follows
that if you accept both conditions you cannot endorse the set of BOP-violating claims.
We turn now to the evaluation of these two antecedent claims, beginning with the
weak classical view.
4 Assessing the weak classical view
The weak classical view we outlined above maintains there is a moral reason to
perform an act insofar as, and to the degree that, it is morally good. Thus, the weak
classical view is false if there are acts that one has a moral reason to perform that are
18 Since BOP allows that some permissible acts may be morally better than others, it does not imply a
commitment to theories like utilitarianism, though it is compatible with them.
19 Like the other example cases, the doctrine of double effect can be made compatible with BOP. One
might claim that there there is a side constraint on intending evil, even when it produces consequences
that are more good while denying that the act that would produce these consequences is all things
considered morally better. The difference in the interpretations depends on how ‘greater good’ is to be
interpreted. Those who would understand ‘greater good’ in the doctrine as all things considered moral
goodness violate BOP. There is, however, something unnatural about the way the doctrine of double effect
is expressed when one adopts the BOP respecting interpretation: why highlight the pro tanto goodness of
the impermissible act if you think it is all things considered morally worse? The BOP violating, all things
considered goodness reading seems most plausible. For example, Faraci writes that in situations like
Thomson’s (1985) surgeon case, ‘‘the deontologist’s position is that killing the one to save the five is
impermissible, despite the fact that it would generate an all-things-considered more valuable outcome’’
(2019: 175).
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not morally good in any respect (even comparably), or if the moral value of an act
does not provide any moral reason for its performance. In what follows we assess
whether either of these ways the weak classical view could be false is plausible.
First we consider three ways moral goodness might be unnecessary for moral
reasons. Then we consider one way that it might be insufficient. Although some of
these objections will turn out to be misunderstandings, discussing them helps to
clarify the weak classical view.
4.1 Badness and reasons
In his defence of the strong classical view Raz notes that you might think bad-
making features can provide reasons, since agents sometimes ‘‘intentionally do what
they take to be bad because, as they see it, it is bad’’ (Raz 1999: 24). For example,
‘‘that an action hurts another makes it an intelligible object of choice [since] a desire
to hurt, and to watch the other being hurt, exercises great appeal for many people’’
or again, that an action ‘‘will break all the norms, also makes it an intelligible object
of choice...we know that often people do what they do precisely because it is the
wrong thing to do’’ (Raz 1999: 24–25). The bad-making features objection claims
there is a distinction between those features that make an action an intelligible
choice and those that make it a good choice. And if bad-making features can make
actions intelligible choices, perhaps they can provide reasons.
Now, prima facie, these are forceful objections to the connection between
reasons and goodness in the strong version of the classical view. Although Raz
himself offers a compelling rebuttal, we will not focus on his response here because
the bad-making features objection is clearly not an objection to the weak classical
view. Even if features like an action’s being wrong or hurtful are capable of
providing reasons tout court, they do not provide moral reasons for action. Perhaps
one’s wish to do the wrong thing because it is wrong can provide a reason that
explains an action. But surely this negatively valued feature does not provide a
moral reason for the action (though it might make another action comparatively
good, and so, provide a reason to perform a different act). Since the weak classical
view concerns the relationship between moral reasons and moral goodness, it
appears unlikely any appeal to bad-making features can succeed.
4.2 Moral neutrality and reasons
You might instead think that there can be moral reasons to perform acts which have
neither good nor bad features. Surely there are many acts that are morally neutral—
getting a coffee, deciding to read one article in a magazine rather than another—and
yet, there also seem to be reasons to perform such acts.
However, the force of this objection depends on the conflation of neutrally
valued and non-valued acts. To say that an act, like getting a cup of coffee, is
neutrally valued is to say that the features of this act are equal in moral value to the
features of a comparative act. (Usually the comparison is to the status quo, but acts
may also be compared to other available options.) We might say that getting a
coffee is morally neutral when you have no stronger moral reason to get the coffee
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than to not get the coffee. There are certainly many cases in which acts are neutrally
valued. It is true, of course, that when the value of performing act x is equal to the
value of performing act y, the agent has no greater reason to do x than she has to do
y. But it does not follow from the fact that x is valued equally to y that she does not
have any reason to perform one of the actions. She simply has no stronger reason to
x than she does to y. Neutrally valued acts pose no threat to the weak classical view,
since the reasons for the act the agent performs are still provided by its good-making
features.
4.3 Rightness and reasons
A much more plausible objection comes from the claim that rightness—not moral
goodness—goes hand in hand with moral reasons. Or, more accurately, the claim
that when it is impermissible to not act we have a moral reason to act.
Now, note that it is not enough to posit a source of moral reasons that differs from
moral goodness if you want to challenge the claim that there can be moral reasons
without moral goodness. You must also show that those acts that rightness-based
considerations give you a reason to perform are not also morally good. Suppose
right-making features are the common source of moral reasons and moral goodness.
If rightness is the common source of both reasons and moral goodness, then all acts
we have moral reason to perform (because they stem from rightness) will still be
morally good (because they also stem from rightness). Consequently, the necessity
claim will not be refuted. Thus, a rightness-based objection to the weak classical
view must show not only that (1) rightness can be the source of moral reasons, but
also (2) some acts that rightness-based considerations provide us with moral reasons
to perform are not morally good in any respect. How plausible are these two claims?
First consider (1). Since permissibility is a modal concept that has only two
possible values, if moral reasons are a function of permissibility, then moral reasons
can also only take one of two values. We would either have a moral reason to
perform an action or we would not. The idea that we either have a moral reason, or
we do not makes sense if, by ‘moral reason’ we mean something like ‘strongest
aggregate reason’. Suppose you could either help a friend move house when you
promised to do so, or skip out to watch television with your partner. There might be
pro tanto moral reasons to do both, but since the promise to your friend weighs
more than (or is lexically prior to) the moral considerations supporting watching
television, you have no all things considered moral reason to watch television. Since
we do sometimes use ‘reasons’ to denote what one has all things considered reason
to do there is precedent for this modal use of the term.
However, the weak classical view understands reasons differently, as consider-
ations that come in varying degrees. It is a claim not about what we have all things
considered moral reasons to do, but about the association of ‘smaller’, pro tanto
moral reasons with moral goodness. Furthermore, note the above motivation of
reasons as a modal concept acknowledges the existence of pro tanto reasons.
Nevertheless, you might think that this is precisely where the weak view goes
wrong: since reasons do stem from rightness-based considerations, they cannot be
the kind of thing that comes in degrees. This is a sort of theoretical stalemate, where
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the defender’s modus ponens is the critic’s modus tollens. It seems safe to say that
the view that moral reasons come in degrees enjoys a broader consensus. It also
allows for more nuanced expressions of the way moral reasons relate to actions, for
example, by capturing the idea that moral reasons can pull agents in different
directions. Nevertheless, we admit there is nothing incoherent about the critic’s
claim that moral reasons are modal and depend on rightness-based considerations.
Now consider (2), the claim that some acts that we have rightness-based moral
reasons to perform are not morally good. One way to motivate this second claim is
via the Kantian notion of moral worth.20 Kant (1993) claims that the only thing of
intrinsic value is a good will (G393–395); which can be illustrated via the concept
of duty (G397); and that only actions done from duty have moral worth (G398).
Actions done from duty are a subset of permissible actions—they are permissible
actions that are performed out of respect for the [moral] law (G400). If moral
goodness is construed as Kantian moral worth, then not all permissible acts are
morally good. But if an act’s permissibility is what provides a moral reason for
performing the act, then there can be acts that we have a moral reason to perform
that are nevertheless not morally worthy, and thus, not morally good.
Note, however, that if you equate moral goodness with Kantian moral worth
(which, to be clear, may not have been Kant’s own position21), you incur a
significant expressive cost. If actions are morally good only if they are done from
duty, then your theory can no longer capture the ordinary claims that murder is
morally worse than theft, since the concept of moral goodness, so understood,
applies to neither act. Your theory also does not always imply that charity is morally
better than getting a cup of coffee, because here too we need to know which, if
either, permissible act is done from duty. Furthermore, the doctrine of double
effect’s claim that there is a moral constraint on intending evil when the evil will be
a means to a greater good implies that there can be morally good, but impermissible
acts. If moral goodness is construed as Kantian moral worth, the doctrine’s claim
would not make sense. Those wishing to reject BOP to save the doctrine of double
effect cannot use Kantian moral worth to motivate (2).
These problems do not undermine Kantian moral worth per se. It is reasonable to
think that there is something morally distinctive about acts that are done from duty.
What they show is that if moral goodness is construed as moral worth—that is, if
Kant’s views about moral worth are applied to moral goodness in a defence of (2)—
then many central uses of the concept of moral goodness cannot be preserved.
There is a second, and more serious problem for the strategy of using Kantian
moral worth to show there can be moral reasons without moral goodness. If you
want to falsify BOP, it is not enough to show that the necessity claim in the weak
classical view is false. As we show in ‘‘Appendix 2’’, BOP also follows from the
weaker claim that moral goodness is sufficient for moral reasons (when conjoined
with reasons monotonicity). The problem for the moral worth approach here is that
20 We do not wish to take a position on how Kant’s views should be interpreted, nor do we claim this
defence of (2) is itself a Kantian position. Rather, we show how one possible interpretation of Kantian
moral worth can motivate claim (2).
21 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify this point.
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it guarantees the sufficiency side of the weak classical view is true. If actions are
morally worthy only if they are done from duty, and you have a moral reason for an
action only if duty requires its performance, then morally worthy (good) acts are a
subset of acts for which you have a moral reason. Therefore, there can never be
moral goodness without moral reason. Since the moral worth approach guarantees
the sufficiency side of the weak classical view is true, and BOP also follows from the
sufficiency claim (and reasons monotonicity), then the moral worth approach
actually ensures that BOP is true. A more promising objection to the weak classical
view is to attack the sufficiency claim, which can be done without construing moral
goodness as moral worth. We now consider this attack on the sufficiency claim.
4.4 Goodness without reasons
If you think that rightness-based considerations are the source of moral reasons, you
can retain a broader understanding of moral goodness while still resisting the weak
classical view by arguing that acts can have good-making features without these
features providing moral reasons for their performance. In this case, the sufficiency
claim in the weak classical view would be false. This approach has the added
advantage of allowing you to respect the doctrine of double effect’s implication that
acts can be morally valuable, at least to some degree, without being morally
permissible.
You might motivate this claim by claiming that moral reasons are understood
subjectively, as those that are capable of explaining why an agent acted as she did.
For example, if Bob is about to inadvertently step in front of a moving car, it seems
it would be morally good for Alice to stop him, and that there is a moral reason for
her to intervene. But if Alice is unaware Bob is about to step into the street, she has
no subjective moral reason to stop him. Thus, even though it would be morally good
to stop Bob, Alice has no (subjective) reason to do so. As Raz puts it, ‘‘when we
explain actions by the reasons for which they were undertaken the focus is on the
agents’ beliefs that they had such and such reasons, beliefs which may be false’’
(1999: 24). Perhaps, then, moral goodness is insufficient for the presence of
subjective moral reasons, since agents are often mistaken or ignorant about what is
good, or about what they have objective reasons to do.
While natural, the subjective reading is mistaken. Both the weak and strong
classical views are about the nature of the things that agents acting on subjective
reasons take themselves to have. These are objective reasons. What the (weak) view
says is that these things have to be (morally) good in some respect. And it argues for
this as follows: when we think of something as a reason, we can only do so if we
think of it as good in some respect. Hence, our very concept of a reason, i.e., of the
things we take ourselves to have when we act for reasons, and so objective reasons,
is the concept of something that is good in some respect. The argument for the
classical view draws out what objective reasons have to be like, if they are to be the
things that people take themselves to have, when they act for (subjective) reasons. It
argues from the beliefs of agents relevant for intentional explanation to features of
the things they have beliefs about, i.e., what such things have to be like for those
beliefs to provide the kind of explanation that intentional explanation provides.
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Since the weak classical view is about objective moral reasons, the subjective
objection fails.
Perhaps you think there is another way to oppose the sufficiency portion of the
weak classical view. Regardless of how compelling your argument is, it will not
vindicate many of the counterexamples to BOP. Suppose the weak classical view’s
sufficiency claim is false and only the necessity claim is retained. Then, as we prove
in ‘‘Appendix 3’’, the conjunction of this (even weaker) version of the weak
classical view and reasons monotonicity of permissibility (3) still implies that all
permissible acts are better than or as good as impermissible acts. This, in turn,
implies that no impermissible acts can be morally better than permissible acts. This
weaker result is compatible with the kidney case. However, it still conflicts with the
counterexamples to BOP based on the doctrine of double effect and conditional
obligations. If you wish to reject BOP because of your intuitions about these
examples, you cannot merely reject the sufficiency portion of the weak classical
view.
In summary, if you want to defend the existence of conditional obligations of the
kind we outline in Sect. 3, or you want to grant that it is all things considered better
to save the many while violating the rights of the one, but you deny that violating
these rights is permissible, then you must show that moral reasons for action are
neither necessary nor sufficient for moral value.
Yet, as we argued in Sect. 4.3, the most plausible argument against the necessity
of moral reasons for moral goodness also establishes that moral reasons are
sufficient for moral goodness. Problematically for BOP deniers, this sufficiency claim
must be false in order to vindicate the core counterexamples to BOP.
The takeaway is that while there are many ways to technically undermine the
connection between moral reasons and moral goodness expressed in the weak
classical view, none of the most plausible approaches depart far enough from BOP to
vindicate the cases that motivate the intuitions that the condition is false. We now
consider the prospects for rejecting the second condition, reasons monotonicity of
permissibility.
5 Assessing reasons monotonicity of permissibility
To begin with, note that you can endorse ethical theories like those used to oppose
the weak classical view without rejecting reasons monotonicity of permissibility. As
we noted, the most plausible opposition to the weak classical view is an approach
that grounds moral reasons in the rightness of an act and not in goodness. However,
this view that rightness-based considerations are the source of moral reasons
supports the second condition: reasons monotonicity of permissibility. This view
that there is a moral reason to perform an act only when it is impermissible to not
perform that act (and you think that :P:x ! Px), implies that any act that there is a
moral reason to perform will be permissible.22 So, insofar as there is a moral reason
22 Note that it does not follow that there is a moral reason to perform any permissible act.
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to perform act y, it is permissible. Thus, the monotonicity condition trivially follows
from the claim that permissibility is the source of moral reasons.
With these remarks out of the way, we now turn to the central question of this
section: How plausible is the monotonicity condition? To answer this, consider first
what must be the case if the condition is false. If the condition is false, then there are
some acts that are impermissible, but for which there are stronger moral reasons to
perform than some permissible acts. Now, prima facie, this implication seems to
conflict with the roles these deontic concepts play in answering questions about
what to do. To find that action y is impermissible, but x is permissible, is clearly to
find that one ought to do the second, but not the first act (provided these are your
only two options). It is hard to make sense of this however, if the impermissible act
turns out to be the one supported more strongly by the moral reasons.
You might try to motivate an objection to the monotonicity condition by
appealing to broader considerations than moral reasons. You could argue that if you
have stronger all things considered reasons to perform the impermissible act
(despite having stronger moral reasons to perform the permissible act), then you
ought to perform the impermissible act. However, this argument equivocates
between moral and all things considered ‘oughts’. The monotonicity condition, like
BOP, is restricted to the moral domain and is silent about the relationship between
prudential, moral, and all things considered reasons for action. The fact that you
have stronger all things considered reasons for performing a morally impermissible
act, does not show that you do not have stronger moral reasons to perform the
permissible act.
The monotonicity condition can be false only if there are considerations other
than moral reasons that determine what we ought morally to do. But this is just what
reasons are—those considerations that serve the function of explaining and guiding
what we ought to do are called reasons. And regardless of what you think grounds
reasons—whether you think they are grounded in rightness-based considerations
and are modal in nature, or that they are grounded in good-making features and are
scalar, or that reasons are fundamental and ground goodness, or that they are
grounded by something else entirely—there seems to be no strong argument against
the claim that role they play in determining what we ought morally to do is, at least
minimally consistent with reasons monotonicity of permissibility.
6 Conclusion
Suppose that you still feel the pull of the drowning case. You think you are not
obliged to save the swimmers, saving one swimmer is better than none, but if you
put out to save the swimmers, it is impermissible to save just one. Clearly, these
three claims entail that there are some impermissible acts that are morally better
than permissible acts, in violation of BOP. Yet many people also intuitively believe
that BOP is true. As we noted in the beginning of the paper, without deeper
arguments that could justify or explain the truth of BOP we are simply left with
conflicting intuitions. Our primary aim in this paper was to identify theoretical
claims that could be used to support or criticise BOP that went beyond mere
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platitudes. We did so in Sect. 2 by identifying two antecedent claims that jointly
entail BOP. In Sect. 3 we identified a number of cases that elicit BOP-violating
intuitions, thus demonstrating the importance of assessing the truth of the two
antecedent claims.
Our secondary aim was to assess the truth of these antecedent claims. In Sect. 4
we showed that the most plausible way to reject the necessity portion of the weak
classical view also entailed the truth of the sufficiency portion of that claim. And as
we show in ‘‘Appendix 2’’, the sufficiency side of the weak classical view also (with
reasons monotonicity) entails BOP. Furthermore, even if the sufficiency portion of
the weak classical view is false, the necessity side of the view (with reasons
monotonicity) entails a weak version BOP that is still incompatible with many of the
cases that motivate an opposition to BOP. That is, in order to vindicate intuitions
about those cases that violate BOP, moral goodness must be neither necessary nor
sufficient for moral reasons.
We discussed the plausibility of reasons monotonicity of permissibility in
Sect. 5. There we argued the condition is true, unless considerations other than
moral reasons can determine what we ought morally to do. Yet, since moral reasons
are defined as those things, whatever they are, that tell us what we ought to do, we
concluded that reasons monotonicity of permissibility is true.
The truth of reasons monotonicity of permissibility and the weak classical view
provide deeper reasons for endorsing BOP and rejecting the BOP violating verdicts in
the counterexample cases. Nevertheless, we confess that we still feel the pull of the
counterexamples, especially cases involving conditional obligations. We have not
discussed which of the general claims (C1)–(C3) is likely to be false in each of the
cses, nor have we provided an error theory explaining why the claims should be so
compelling in the first place. We believe these are both fruitful areas for further
analysis.
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Appendix
1 Entailment proof
The weak classical view (2) and reasons monotonicity of permissibility (3) jointly
entail BOP (1). That is:
½8x; y 2 X : x<r y $ x<m y ^ ½8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ ! Py
)½8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x m y
ð4Þ
To prove (4) we first prove the following lemma:
8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ½ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ ! Py ! ½ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y ð5Þ
Proof of Lemma Assume ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ ! Py. Take Px and :Py. To show:
x r y.
The contrapositive of ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ ! Py is:
:Py! :ðPx ^ ðy<r xÞÞ, equivalent to
:Py! ð:Px _ :ðy<r xÞÞ, equivalent to
:Py! ð:Px _ x r yÞ, by completeness.
From :Py and :Py ! ð:Px _ x r yÞ, it follows that either :Px or x r y. Since
we have Px, it follows that x r y. h
Proof of (4) Assume (2) and (3) hold. To show: (1) holds.
From (3) (by assumption) and lemma (5) we have ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y. By (2)
and completeness, this is equivalent to ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x m y, which is (1). h
2 BOP via the sufficiency of the weak classical view
Suppose you abandon the necessity claim in the weak classical view, so that
8x; y 2 X : x<m y ! x<r y ð6Þ
Then, (6) and (3) entail BOP (1).
Proof Assume that (6) and (3) hold. To show: BOP (1) holds. That is to say, assume
that Px and :Py hold. To show: x m y. h
By reasons monotonicity (3) and lemma (5), we have ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y.
From Px ^ :Py (by assumption) and ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y, we have x r y.
By definition, x r y is equivalent to x<r y and :ðy<r xÞ.
By (6), we have y<m x ! y<r x.
The contrapositive of which is :ðy<r xÞ ! :ðy<m xÞ.
Thus, using :ðy<r xÞ, we have :ðy<m xÞ.
By completeness of <m, we must have x<m y.
From :ðy<m xÞ and x<m y, it follows by definition that x m y. h
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3 Weakening the weak classical view
Suppose you abandon the sufficiency claim in the weak classical view, so that
8x; y 2 X : x<ry ! x<m y ð7Þ
Then, (7) and (3) entail the following weak betterness of permissibility claim:
8A 2 Z; 8x; y 2 A : ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x<m y ð8Þ
Proof Assume that (7) and (3) hold. To show: (8) holds. That is to say, assume that
Px and :Py hold. To show: x<m y.
From (3) and lemma (5), we have (ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y.
From Px ^ :Py (by assumption) and ðPx ^ :PyÞ ! x r y, we have x r y.
By definition, x r y is equivalent to x<r y and :ðy<r xÞ.
From x<r y and (7), we have x<m y. h
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